Feed-in-tariff (FIT) policies aim at driving down the cost of renewable energies by fostering learning and accelerating the diffusion of green technologies. Under FIT mechanisms, governments purchase green energy at tariffs that are set above market price. The success or failure of FIT policies, in turn, critically depend on how these tariffs are determined and adjusted over time. This paper provides insights and guidance into designing effective and cost-efficient FIT programs such as these. To that end, we propose a dynamic optimization modeling framework that captures the key network externalities contributing to the technology evolution path. We show in our framework that the investments' profitability guaranteed by the tariffs should either always increase or always decrease as time progresses. This is in contrast with the current practice of FIT-implementing jurisdictions which typically try to maintain the same level of profitability across the policy horizon. Further, we determine how the structure of the optimal policy (ascending vs. descending profitability) changes with technology and market characteristics as well as with the policy objectives. In particular, when the policy horizon is endogenous and the policy goal is a target on the technology cost reduction, our results reveal that the investors' profitability should increase (resp. decrease) over time for low (reps. high) values of learning rates or penetration speeds.
Introduction
Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) are policy instruments that attract investments in renewable energy by setting a long-term guaranteed purchase agreement for green power producers to sell their electricity into the grid (Klein 2008; Mendonca et al. 2009 ). Among existing policy mechanisms to stimulate the deployment of green energy, FIT policies are the most widely implemented and have proven to be the most promising of all, accounting for a bigger share of renewable energy dispersion than any other support scheme (European Commission 2008; Fouquet and Johansson 2008; Mendonca et al. 2009 Nonetheless, the implementation of FITs is not always successful. For instance, the Spain's FIT program during 2006-2008 period had to be hastily interrupted, ending with government expenditures twenty times higher than budgeted (Deutsche Bank 2009). Indeed, the success of FIT schemes critically depends on the tariffs at which governments decide to purchase green electricity, which, in turn, determine the level of profitability for investors (Mendonca et al. 2009; Fell 2009 ). Overall, too aggressive tariffs (higher levels of profitability) attract a wider range of investors by making less efficient projects financially viable, but put big burden on taxpayers' shoulders. Too conservative remunerations, on the other hand, may decelerate market expansion and limit the scope of the technology only to those who operate very efficiently.
The goal of this paper is to address fundamental tradeoffs such as those encountered by lawmakers in designing FIT policy mechanisms. More specifically, we form normative recommendations on how to set and update feed-in compensations for a renewable energy technology in order to accelerate its deployment, while containing the expenditure at a minimum level. To that end, we propose a dynamic optimization modeling framework that captures, at a macro level, the key network externalities 1 contributing to the technology evolution path.
The eventual aspiration of a FIT policy is to drive down the cost of renewables through technological leapfrogging and toward commercial maturity. The maturity threshold for a renewable energy technology, often referred to as grid parity, is attained when the technology becomes cost-competitive. Once such a threshold is transcended, market forces take over and no further government intervention is needed. In conjunction with this ultimate ambition, various intermediate targets may be envisioned in accordance with regulators' priorities to underscore their political will and further incentivize societal engagement (Couture et al. 2010; Mendonca et al. 2009 ). These targets are typically in the form of capacity landmarks, cost reduction thresholds, or share in total energy portfolio. For example, France has mandated 1,100 MW of solar power (PV and Thermal) by the end of 2012, and 5,400
MW by the end of 2020, whereas China has required its renewables to account for a 15% share in the nation's total energy consumption by 2020 (REN21 2011). In view of this common practice, we study the policy design problem with cost-minimizing objective and under two different scenarios: (i) exogenously-imposed capacity or cost targets with binding timetables, and (ii) endogenously-induced policy horizon with grid-parity goal.
Our model also captures the two main network effects that FIT schemes leverage on, which together drive the dynamics of technology evolution over time: (i) technological learning, and (ii) diffusion process. Technological progress, which takes place as a result of knowledge accumulation, competition, and economy of scale, introduces the most prominent market trend and the primary rationale for dynamic control of feed-in prices. The decline in technology cost as a function of its proliferation builds on a well-known concept in economics literature which is interchangeably referred to as experience curve, learning curve or learning-by-doing, and was formalized by the seminal work of Arrow (1962) (see also Yelle 1979) . This effect was later adopted in energy economics to describe cost-cutting trends in energy technologies (see, for example, International Energy Agency 2000; McDonald and Schrattenholzer 2001; Klein 2008) . The notion of learning-by-doing is based on the observation that for every doubling of production size (or output), the cost of technology tends to drop by a certain percentage, formally characterized as learning rate (Yelle 1979) . 2 The way investors react to an incentive policy also hinges heavily on society's awareness of the new technology and the perception of its future outlook (see Jager 2006) , which forms a second major dynamic swaying market conditions. The spread of information about a new technology or product in the market is governed by social learning, and is formally referred to as diffusion process in the marketing literature (Bass 1969; Mahajan et al. 1990 ). This notion reflects on the fact that further penetration of a new technology in the society enhances public consciousness about its value, which, in turn, creates a larger potential demand (see Geroski 2000 and Rao and Kishore 2010 for more on the penetration pattern of a new technology).
To track and encourage technological improvements and maintain the market-contingency of the policy over time, FIT levels are often amended downward for installations in subsequent years (Fell 2009; Klein et al. 2010; Couture et al. 2010) . Tariff degressions such as these are usually performed periodically. In most cases, feed-in prices fall annually by a fixed percentage, and the new rates are in effect for projects that are becoming operational within that timeframe. 3 For example, Germany applies an annual degression schedule for renewable energy technologies which depends on the level of the technology maturity and ranges from 1% (e.g. for onshore wind) to 10% (e.g. for solar PV) (Germany RES Act 2008) .
Regardless of the financial yardstick in use for investment appraisal (e.g. rate of return, profitability index, etc.), legislators typically attempt to maintain the same level of profitability across years by dynamically fine-tuning tariffs offered to newly-commissioned projects. For instance, a 2010 report by UK's Department of Energy and Climate Change states (UK DECC 2010): "Accordingly, the tariffs that are available for new installations will degress each year, where they reduce to reflect predicted technology cost reductions to ensure that new installations receive the same approximate rates of return as installations already supported through FITs." Depending on the technology, the intended rates of return lie in the 5%-8% range for UK (UK DECC 2010) and degressions are exerted to retain this nominal yield in consideration of cost realities. The Germany's Renewable Energy Source Act is established based on an approximate 7% rate of return for well-operated installations (Fell 2009 ). Profit margins in France relies, in a similar manner, on profitability index, defined as the ratio between project's overall discounted payoff and its total discounted cost (Mendonca et al. 2009 ).
Our analysis reveals that, it is often suboptimal to uphold the same level of profitability for installations in subsequent years. In an environment where market demand is governed by learning and diffusion effects, it is optimal for the administration to deliver profits which are monotonically increasing or decreasing throughout the policy horizon. This finding calls for compensations to be progressively pegged to generation costs in a specific manner, so that the yield on investment in the technology consistently moves upward or downward over time. In our set-up, profitability index (PI) keeps track of investors' surplus and offers a simple representation of the results. That is, the optimal PI schedule exhibits a monotonic pattern, an ascending-PI or descending-PI policy (API or DPI, respectively), the direction of which is determined by technology and market characteristics. By contrast, current FIT practices adjust the tariffs over time such as to keep PI (or equivalently the rate of return) constant over time.
Intuitively, our API policy sets the efficiency-breakpoints tight in early periods and moderates them gradually as time progresses. This has the advantage of funding only efficient projects early on and at low cost, while utilizing their learning and diffusion effects for the subsequent years. Also, the policy postpones bigger expenditures to later periods which can 3 In a more recent development, some countries supplement their periodic degression schedule with a more advanced mechanism called responsive (or corridor) degression in order to make it more contingent on the pace of market growth (Couture et al. 2010; Germany RES Act 2008) .
be valuable due to discounting. Nevertheless, conservative payments at the early stages also imply slower growth and a smaller pool of efficient investors in the future. A DPI policy, on the other hand, offers aggressive tariffs at the outset which bears mobilizing some lessefficient investments and over-compensating the very efficient ones. The vigorous growth of the technology in the early periods, however, has learning and diffusion implications which come into benefit as PI starts to decrease.
The direction of monotonicity in the optimal PI schedule depends on the underlying technology and market characteristics, and the regulatory landscape surrounding it. In particular, we show how the optimal strategy varies as a function of technological learning rate, penetration speed, and the way policy goals are laid out. When a capacity landmark is set to be reached within a time limit, the model reveals that high or low learning rates lead to an API policy, while moderate values of learning rates give rise to a DPI policy. If capacity targets are replaced with cost milestones, this result reduces to a structure where higher learning rates entail API and lower rates entail DPI strategies. When the technology is not close to maturity, similar result holds for the penetration speed, so that strong (resp. weak) penetration corresponds to an API (resp. DPI) policy. Further, under some fairly non-restrictive assumptions, all these results are extendable to the situation where no time window is enforced and the policy horizon is configured endogenously. These findings also speak to FIT implementation failures, such as Spain's experience where underestimation of market penetration capabilities led to excessive payments and stimulated a rapid growth without driving adequate cost improvements.
Finally, while the profitability index should always be monotone in time, the same is not necessarily true for the number of new installations that are periodically added to the system. Evidences from growth pattern in FIT-adopting countries, however, suggest that governments intend to increase the annual capacity installation over time. For example, solar PV capacity expansion in Germany exhibits an exponential growth since 1990 (AGEE Stat 2012). By contrast, our results state that under DPI strategies, the added capacity can be decreasing across periods.
The area of sustainability in the OM literature has been very active over the past few years (see Kleindorfer et al. 2005 for a review of earlier works). Government regulations have been studied in connection with supply chain coordination (Ovchinnikov and Raz 2012; Arifoglu et al. 2012; Mamani et al. 2011) , new product design and recyclability (Plambeck and Wang 2009; Atasu et al. 2009 ), and carbon footprint abatement (Benjaafar et al. 2010 ), among others. However, there are not too many papers that specifically deal with policy design questions in relation with technological adoption. Krass et al. (2012) address the impact of environmental taxation, subsidy and rebate tools on green technology adoption by a monopolistic firm, and the corresponding social welfare implications. Drake (2011) analyzes the effect of carbon tariffs on technology choice decisions for domestic and foreign firms in an asymmetrically regulated environment. Aflaki and Netessine (2011) highlight the importance of supply intermittency in renewable capacity investment. Drake et al. (2012) study emission regulations such as tax and cap-and-trade and their influence on technology choice and capacity decisions by firms in a newsvendor setting.
The recent working paper by Lobel and Perakis (2011) is the closet to this work. They develop a model for solar PV adoption which includes both learning-by-doing and diffusion dynamics. They show convexity properties and suggest based on their analysis that FITs in Germany should be adjusted. By contrast, our paper focuses on characterizing the structure of the optimal FIT schedule and how it is impacted by technology as well as market characteristics. Further, they assume that investors are homogenous in terms of their solar yield and the policy target is on capacity with an exogenous time limit. Our model addresses these concerns by accounting for investors' efficiency spread and endogenizing the policy horizon. Shrimali and Baker (2012) also explore the optimal design of FITs in a two period model where diffusion dynamic is absent and target is set on technology cost. They distinguish between two primary drivers of decline in cost: learning-by-doing and economy of scale. Depending on which basis is in consideration for cost reduction and how stringent the cost target is, they identify the periods in which the subsidy has to be provided as well as its magnitude.
In a more broader perspective, this paper also relates to the extensive body of literature on revenue management and dynamic pricing (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) . Generally speaking, we use price adjustments to control demand over time, when demand is deterministic and customers (investors) are myopic. However, the main divergence (and complication) here arises from the fact that demand in different periods are interconnected through network externalities, factors which are typically absent in dynamic pricing models.
In the marketing literature, dynamic pricing of a new product or innovation in the presence of network effects has received a great deal of attention (see Krishnan et al. 1999 for a review, and Kalish and Lilien 1983 for an early study of subsidies for alternative energy innovations).
In the reminder of this paper, we describe the model in Section 2. Analytical results on the structure of the optimal FIT policy are derived in Section 3. Section 4 explores the impact of technology and market characteristics on the optimal strategy. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Model Description
Consider a government which aims at boosting a renewable energy technology in its jurisdiction by means of a FIT program. To formulate the policy design problem faced by lawmakers in this situation, we construct an intertemporal model of technology evolution process, which integrates learning and diffusion effects with market responses to policy regulations.
We assume that acquiring one unit of technology costs c t in period t, which includes material, installation, administrative and operations costs over the project's lifetime. For example, c t can represent the cost of obtaining 1 kWp (kilo-Watt-peak) nominal generation capacity of solar PV as well as the corresponding installation and maintenance costs. The net present value of all benefits and remunerations that an investor may collect for one unit of technology acquired in period t is denoted by p t . So in short, c t and p t are the lump sum cost and payoff to the investor, respectively, per unit of technology launched in period t.
Under a FIT law, each year the administration offers a contract which locks in a price over a specified time-period (typically 15-25 years). Newly-installed projects are the only ones eligible for this contract, which allows them to sell their generated electricity to the grid at that price until the duration of their contract expires. Then, p t is the total discounted payoff that a developer can retrieve over the length of the contract for her efficiently-run unit of technology, e.g., by producing and selling 1 kW electricity per unit time. Hence, p t is proportional to the tariffs (or purchasing prices) enacted by the government in period t (i.e., p t ∝ F IT t ), and can be traced accordingly.
Investor's Problem
A representative investor (developer) in our model is an agent who can acquire one unit of technology and exploit it toward benefiting from FIT regulations. We associate each individual investor with a type, which reveals her efficiency in utilizing the technology. The type of an investor reflects any intrinsic technical or informational advantages she may have, which enhance her capabilities in generating more value from her installation. In particular, a type θ developer can collect only θ fraction of the maximum possible payoff, p t , so that θ ∈ [0, 1] mirrors her distance from a fully efficiently-managed unit. For example, investor heterogeneity for the roof-mounted solar modules may relate to the amount of absorbed insolation which varies with the solar orientation of the house. Then, a type θ investor is one who is capable of producing θ kW electricity per unit time from 1 kWp nominal capacity.
Such an investor in period t weighs the two alternatives of adopting the technology and thereby receiving the net payoff θp t − c t versus the reservation payoff of zero. Hence, she chooses to opt in if
A developer's type can take any value between 0 and 1, and follows distribution F (.) with density f (.) which is positive and differentiable over its support. Investors are not strategic in the sense that they do not wait in anticipation of getting a higher margin in the future. That is, a potential investment can be mobilized in the present period if offered a non-negative payoff. This holds when investors' time discount for the green technology in our setting is quite steep in light of other investment opportunities.
More generally, this happens when investors are short-sighted agents who try to maximize their utility with a myopic timeframe in mind (as in Lobel and Perakis 2011). Given this assumption and following Equation (1), new adoptions in period t consist of investors of type higher than the threshold γ t = c t /p t , as depicted in Figure 1 . Thus, the probability of a random investor joining the program in period t isF γ t , whereF (.) = 1 − F (.) is the complementary cumulative distribution function of investor type.
Market Dynamics
Our model captures the most essential dynamics contributing to the evolution of a new technology in the marketplace. First, we borrow the notion of learning curve from the economics literature to formalize the decline in technology cost due to expansion of its usage.
This phenomenon corresponds to the cost reductions caused by innovation, competition and economy of scale as well as improvements in knowledge, skills, techniques and procedures.
Among several functional forms which have been proposed to represent the learning curve, exponential decay (power function) is the most common approach (Yelle 1979; Wand and Leuthold 2011) . Under this paradigm, the technology cost drops exponentially as a function of its widespread. In particular, the cost of acquiring one unit of technology in period t is given by
where c 0 and M 0 are the initial cost and market size before the introduction of the FIT bill, respectively, and M t−1 is the cumulative installed capacity (i.e., the market size) by the end of period t − 1. Also, α ∈ (0, 1) is the learning parameter, 5 representing the speed at which the proliferation of the technology deflates its cost. In view of Equation (2), each time the cumulative adoption of the technology doubles, its cost drops by a fixed percentage which is known as learning rate in the literature. 6 Given the monotonic one-to-one correspondence between α and learning rate, we use these two exchangeably hereafter when we refer to the magnitude of learning.
When α = 0, there is no learning and cost remains independent of the capacity growth.
On the other hand, α = 1 describes a situation where doubling the technology penetration cuts its cost in half. We consider α to be no more than 1 in our framework, which can be supported by available empirical evidences suggesting learning rates between 10%-30% for renewable energy technologies (van der Zwaan and Rabl 2003).
While typical learning rates of 10%-30% have been reported for different technologies, the rate is closer to 20% for solar PV systems (van der Zwaan and Rabl 2003; also see Wand and Leuthold 2011; van Benthem et al. 2008; Nemet 2006 for more analysis on solar technology learning curve). Moreover, recent studies have come to the conclusion that the cost of electricity from wind turbines falls by 7%-19% for each twofold increase in wind power generation capacity (Krohn et al. 2009 ; also see Bolinger and Wiser 2009; Junginger et al. 2005 for more specific details on wind power technology learning curve). In a longer time perspective, the cost of wind and solar electricity generation has dropped by more than 50% over the last decade, which is attributable to learning effects (Mendonca et al. 2009 ).
The second major dynamic influencing the dissemination of a new technology accounts for network effects such as word-of-mouth and spread of information, and is captured by a diffusion process. The demand for the technology is slim when it is first introduced to the market. As more adoptions take place and the technology penetrates, societal awareness about its value rises, which, in turn, generates more potential interest for the subsequent years. We assume that each unit of existing adoption gains the attention of n uninformed agents, which comprise the prospective demand for the next period. The penetration coefficient, denoted by n, can be defined as the potential appeal created for the technology in period t by each unit of operating installation. That is, n denominates the rate at which the information about the technology spreads from adopters to non-adopters. It follows that the potential demand for the technology in period t equals nM t−1 , each of which will be unleashed by the government's program if it is financially viable, i.e., if its type exceeds γ t . This implies that if payoff p t is offered in period t, it expands the market size by
where m t is the capacity of new installments added in this period. This quantity decreases with γ t and hence, is decreasing in technology cost c t , and increasing in payoff p t . The technology dispersion evolves then in period t according to
for t = 1, 2, . . ., where the boundary value M 0 is given.
This way of modeling the diffusion process can be regarded as a special case of the internal influence diffusion process (Mahajan et al. 1990 ) in which the ultimate potential of the market is very large compared to its current scope. 7 As a result, the diffusion rate is approximately proportional to present adoption breadth. It should be noted that this approach rules out a saturation effect. This modeling choice is justified in our domain, since the fulfillment of maturity goal requires capacity landmarks which are far below the potential market size (i.e., how large the underlying market can grow). For example, the current installed capacity of solar PV in Germany stays under 1% of the potential achievable size (Lobel and Perakis 2011).
In our formulation, the implicit assumption has been that efficiency composition of the market does not change with time. That is, while the efficient segments of the potential demand (types higher than γ t ) are assimilated in a period, the distribution of the investor type remains unchanged for the succeeding period. Considering the fact that the market is far from saturation, this assumption indicates that there are still a huge number of efficient investors left who may be potentially interested in joining in. Therefore, the attraction of a tiny population of efficient investors is not going to have any meaningful impact on the general heterogeneity structure represented by F (.).
The Government's Problem
When designing the FIT regulations, the policymaker's ultimate ambition is to achieve market integration of the green technology at minimum cost. Despite this fact, most of
FIT-implementing jurisdictions incorporate various intermediate targets into their law to
show their political commitment and provide more motives for citizens' involvement. These targets are often set on the renewables share in total energy consumption or accumulated generation capacity, as it is being done in most of the European Union countries (see REN21 2011). In the context of our model, this corresponds to having a capacity targetM which has to be surpassed by an exogenous deadline T .
To construct the government's optimization problem, we note that the amount of electricity produced by a type θ developer is proportional to θ. Consider period t in which all types θ ≥ γ t subscribe to the program and their investments add up to m t units of capacity (see Equation (3)). The total power generated by these new installations equals m t E θ θ ≥ γ t per period, and requires the overall compensation of p t m t E θ θ ≥ γ t over their contract duration. Thus, the government's total expected expenditure for the projects launched in this period becomes p t m t E θ θ ≥ γ t , and the problem can be cast as
where Z(., .) denotes the government's minimum cost, δ is the discount factor, and m t and c t evolve according to Equations (2)- (4).
In light of the one-to-one correspondence between cost and capacity, as provided in Equation (2), the above problem can be equivalently recast with a target on technology cost. That is, the cost equivalent of the capacity targetM can be identified according tõ
and Problem (P1), with a slight abuse of notation in the first argument of function Z(., .), can be rewritten as
In Section 4.1 where we study policy implications of different α values, Problems (P1) and (P1 ) are not equivalent anymore and possess different optimal solutions.
When gird parity is envisioned as the eventual objective of the FIT policy and no intermediate target is introduced, the policymaker's problem takes a different form. Grid parity takes place when the cost of technology falls to a level where it can compete with conventional power production methods without requiring any additional legislative support. In this case, a cost targetc * is in effect, wherec * is the threshold at which the technology matures, i.e., it becomes self-sustainable. More specifically,c * can be interpreted as the prevailing cost of traditional energy production powerplants such as those fueled by coal or natural gas. We assume there is a utility Π that the society enjoys per period once this goal is fulfilled. The utility Π includes the avoided negative environmental and social externality of competing fossil fuel-based energy sources, job creation, and energy security benefits (International Energy Agency 2011; Couture et al. 2010 ).
With such a social welfare at stake, there is no need to exogenously fix the duration of the policy. In other words, the evolution trajectory of the technology must be left to the market forces, and the target accomplishment time must be endogenized. Then, with a slight abuse of notation by changing the arguments of the function Z(.), the problem converts to
While Problems (P1) and (P2) are reflecting two distinct objective-setting practices, they can be linked if we decompose Problem (P2) into two hierarchical steps. First, for a given T , the period at which the technology reaches grid parity and the FIT policy terminates, we optimize over variables p t for t = 1, . . . , T . This is represented in Problem (P1 ), or, equivalently, Problem (P1). Then, in the second step, we solve the problem to find the optimal T . Alternatively, Problem (P2) can be reframed in the following format in which the two steps are solved simultaneously:
The next section is devoted to analyzing Problems (P1) and (P2), and characterizing their optimal solutions.
Optimal FIT Policies
We start by the two optimization problems outlined in Section 2.3, and derive their corresponding optimal FITs. Then, we highlight the structural properties of these schedules and attempt to gain insight into their policy implications.
Capacity Target with Fixed Policy Horizon
First consider Problem (P1). This problem echoes the current practice of governments implementing FIT incentives. The policy sets a target on cumulative nominal capacity with a time limit by which the capacity milestone has to be surpassed. When the policy duration T is imposed exogenously, it may emerge as too tight for fulfillment of the desired target.
If T is very small, even offering excessive tariffs falls short in meeting the objective because the demand size is capped in each period. In this case, we call the target infeasible. The next lemma specifies a lower bound for T which excludes this extreme scenario.
Lemma 1. Consider the optimization Problem (P1). The targetM is feasible and can be achieved in T periods if and only if T ≥ T min , where T min is defined as
The notation x denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. The lower bound T min is associated with the most extreme FIT regime, in the sense of being too generous. It relates to a scenario where staggering tariffs are enacted in each period to attract the entire potential demand.
When T in Problem (P1) exceeds T min , a reformulation of the dynamic optimization enables us to establish a set of optimality equations to describe the optimal solution. To proceed, we define function φ(.) as φ(.
, where g(.) and h(.) are given by
As shown in Lemma 4 in the appendix, h(.) is decreasing and hence invertible, which implies that φ(.) is a well-defined function. The following result makes use of this function, and
shows the existence and uniqueness of the optimal sequence of ratios γ t 's (defined as c t /p t in Section 2.1).
Proposition 1. Consider the optimization Problem (P1), and assume that the target is feasible. Then, there exists time period τ * ≥ 0 such that the optimal sequence {γ * t } t=1,...,T satisfies γ * In the proof of Proposition 1, we first reformulate the problem as a deterministic dynamic program in which the actions are represented in terms of periodic installments, m t 's. We then optimize over the last period's installation using the Envelope Theorem, which further reveals the optimality equation for all periods. The uniqueness of the optimal solution follows from the structural properties of the functions g(.) and h(.). The recursive equation γ * t+1 = φ(γ * t ) together with the requirement that M * T =M provide all the equations needed to uniquely identify the optimal schedule of p t 's.
Grid Parity Goal with Endogenous Policy Horizon
Now, we turn our attention to Problem (P2) and note that T = ∞ with p t = 0 for all t always provides a candidate solution that leads to the overall cost of zero. The situation where such a solution is optimal corresponds to the technology being undesirable, which happens when the policy cost of advancing it outweighs the long-term benefits. Then, it is optimal not to pursue the technology and shut down the program right away. When this is not the case, the optimal policy meets its goal in a finite time window by stimulating a positive amount of investment in each period.
Lemma 2. Consider Problem (P2). There exists threshold α so that the technology is desirable if and only if α ≥ α, while fixing other model parameters. Similarly, thresholds n, c 0 , and Π exist so that the technology is desirable if and only if n ≥ n, c 0 ≤c 0 , and Π ≥ Π,
respectively.
The implication of Lemma 2 is that a desirability frontier surface can be established in α, n, c 0 , Π space, dividing it into two desirable and undesirable regions. In the remainder of this section, we focus on the case where the technology is desirable, and the structure of the optimal policy surrounding it.
We can now present the equivalent of Proposition 1 for the case where time horizon is endogenous.
Proposition 2. If the technology is desirable in Problem (P2), then optimal planning horizon T * , is such that T * ≥ T min . Furthermore, the optimal ratios {γ * t } t=1,...,T * , are unique and satisfy γ * t+1 = φ(γ * t ) for t = 1, . . . , T * − 1.
It is worth mentioning a distinction between Propositions 1 and 2. When time horizon is endogenous, Proposition 2 indicates that it is never optimal to delay the implementation of the FIT policy. That is, the profitability offered in each period under the optimal policy must be nonzero, so that γ * t < 1 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T * .
Structure of the Optimal FIT Schedule
The profitability index is defined in our context as π t = 1/γ t = p t /c t , which quantifies the amount of value generated per monetary unit invested. This financial measure is commonly used for ranking investment projects and appraising their profitability.
Theorem 1. Suppose the target is feasible in Problem (P1) or the technology is desirable in Problem (P2). In both cases, optimal profitability indices {π * t } t=1,...,T or {π * t } t=1,...,T * , are monotone over the policy horizon.
Proof: In Lemma 4 in the appendix, we prove that functions g(.) and h(.) are both decreasing. Thus, the function φ(.) = h −1 • g (.) is a well-defined increasing function. When τ * = 0, Proposition 1 implies that γ * t+1 = φ(γ * t ) for all t. Therefore, if γ * 1 ≤ γ * 2 , we have φ(γ * 1 ) ≤ φ(γ * 2 ) which translates into γ * 2 ≤ γ * 3 . The same logic can be applied iteratively to show that γ * t ≤ γ * t+1 for all t, which forms an increasing sequence of γ * t 's (i.e., a decreasing sequence of π * t 's). Similarly, we can deduce that γ * 1 > γ * 2 entails a decreasing sequence of γ * t 's (i.e., an increasing sequence of π * t 's). Finally, if τ * ≥ 1, we have γ * t = 1 for the first τ * periods. Lemma 6 in the appendix shows that in this case, the sequence {γ * t } t>τ * is always decreasing.
According to Theorem 1, the yield offered by government to investments made in the technology in different periods should not necessarily be equal. Instead, it is optimal for the lawmakers to either always increase or always decrease the attractiveness of such an investment over time. This goes against current practice which typically set tariff levels so as to retain the same level of profitability for projects commissioned in different years. (ii) Descending profitability index (DPI): this mechanism offers more aggressive tariffs early on to encourage a rapid market growth, and ratchets down profitability as time progresses to narrow the policy scope to only efficient segments of investor pool.
The tradeoff encountered by regulators in choosing between the two policy schemes described above is manifold. A DPI strategy offers higher profit margin in early periods to accelerate the pace of market growth. Rapid market expansion under such a policy brings about beneficial consequences in two ways. First, more learning take place early on and the technology cost drops at a faster rate. Second, attracting bigger portions of the market expedites the spread of information and enlarges prospective demand, which translates into a larger pool of efficient projects. Both of these effects enable the government to advance the policy goals in subsequent years at a lower cost. However, a DPI policy requires big expenditures in the outset to mobilize some less-efficient installations and provides excessive remuneration to very efficient ones.
On the other hand, under an API framework, the market grows slowly in the early periods due to conservative tariffs which appeal only to efficient developers. While slower market growth moderates technological progress and public consciousness about the technology, most of the market uptake is pushed toward the end of the horizon when the learning and diffusion benefits of early periods have materialized. Postponing bigger expenses to the later periods in the API regime also entails discounting advantages which is of interest to the legislators. In consideration of tradeoffs such as these, the direction of monotonicity under the optimal policy depends on the underlying market characteristics and may vary for different jurisdictions (see Section 4).
Before closing this section, we would like to highlight the distinction between the two sequences of profitability indices and periodic installations. The following proposition states that there may be situations where a non-monotone structure emerges for annual market growth. Specifically, it may be optimal to have a period in which the added capacity is smaller compared to its preceding period.
Proposition 3. For any T ≥ T min in Problem (P1), the optimal sequence {m * t } t=1,...,T is increasing if {π * t } t=1,...,T is increasing, but can be non-monotone if {π * t } t=1,...,T is decreasing. In particular, the same result holds for T = T * in Problem (P2).
Next, we study the behavior of the optimal policy in general, and see how it is influenced by model parameters. We address this question with respect to technology and market characteristics, and derive the corresponding policy implications for both exogenous and endogenous time windows.
Impact of Technology and Market Characteristics
In this section, we investigate the impact of learning rate and penetration coefficient. That is, we show how the optimal strategy structure (DPI versus API) changes with the speed at which technology maturity and market penetration occur.
We first present a sufficient condition which guarantees the optimality of an API policy.
Proposition 4. For any T ≥ T min in Problem (P1), the inequality (1 + n) α−1 ≥ δ is a sufficient condition for having an increasing {π * t } t=1,...,T sequence. In particular, the same result holds for Problem (P2).
Hence, if α is close enough to 1, n is sufficiently small, or δ is distant enough from 1, the optimal policy calls for an API arrangement, i.e., it is optimal to raise the profitability of capitals invested in the technology across the policy lifetime.
Learning Parameter α
When α varies, contemplating a capacity milestone is no longer equivalent to a cost threshold (see Equation (2)). In other words, how far the technology cost declines in response to attainment of capacity targetM is α-dependent. As a result, Problems (P1) and (P1 ) are not identical anymore, and have to be treated separately.
Theorem 2. Consider Problem (P1) where a capacity targetM is set to be accomplished by the exogenously-imposed deadline T , and assume that T ≥ T min so that the target is feasible. Then, there exist thresholdsα(M , T ) andα(M , T ) on the learning parameter α so that the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is
and (iv) constant if α =α(M , T ) orα(M , T ).

Further,α(M , T ) is decreasing inM and increasing in T , whereasα(M , T ) increases with
M and decreases with T .
Theorem 2 indicates that if learning occurs at a low or high enough rate, that is, if α is sufficiently close to 0 or 1, an API policy is preferred and the profitability index schedule should increase with time. Moderate values of α, on the other hand, requires a DPI policy in which profit margin is reduced as technology grows. Moreover, the length of the interval over which such a DPI strategy is optimal shrinks from both sides as the planning horizon extends or the capacity target subsides.
Recall from Proposition 1 that too high values of T may justify suspending the policy for the first few periods due to discounting benefits. Such extreme values for T , while may rarely be encountered in realistic environments, are still captured in Theorem 2. More precisely, when τ * ≥ 1, the optimal profitability index sequence is always increasing with its first τ * elements being equal to one. Therefore,α(M , T ) andα(M , T ) become equal in this case and the second interval in Theorem 2 vanishes.
The intuition behind these findings comes from the tradeoffs outlined under Theorem 1. When α is small enough, there is not much value in learning to extract. As a result, the high cost of attracting bigger portions of the distribution in early periods cannot be offset in future periods, because the technology cost remains relatively high. Benefits which can be exploited from diffusion effects under rapid market growth is not high enough to justify its excessive early expenditures. Similarly, sufficiently high α empowers the government to drive down the technology cost even by limiting the policy appeal only to very efficient investors. Therefore, in both cases, vigorous market expansion in early periods appear suboptimal, and Theorem 2 recommends an API framework.
For moderate learning, in contrast, it pays off to stretch the investment attractiveness to less efficient projects at the outset in anticipation of utilizing the learning and diffusion consequences as time progresses. The value gained from these externalities is adequately high to rationalize supporting some less-efficient installations and over-subsidizing efficientlyoperated ones, as happens under a DPI regime.
According to case (iv) in Theorem 2,α(M , T ) andα(M , T ) are the only values of the learning parameter for which the optimal policy is consistent with the current practice of uniform profitability across time. Finally, in the last part of the theorem, a longer T or less ambitiousM gives more flexibility in achieving the program's target. Thus, the policymaker can afford to ease up on early market growth by implementing an API policy, as there is more time for its gradual expansion. Figure 2 demonstrates an example of the optimal policy as described by Theorem 2. For small or high values of α, as depicted in Figures 2(a) and 2(c), the sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is increasing and an API policy prevails. For moderate values of α where the learning rate changes between 12% and 19%, the sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T decreases and gives rise to a DPI arrangement, as illustrated in Figure 2(b) . Under all these scenarios, the uniform profitability mechanism is outperformed by the disclosed optimal policies. In particular, we have observed in our numerical examples that the sub-optimality of the uniform profitability policy may be as low as 0% (when α is close toα orα), or as high as 80% (when α is away fromα andα).
When a cost target is imposed, as in Problem (P1 ), a new effect is introduced into the model. In particular, the total capacity required for termination of the program is no longer fixed, and changes with learning rate. Following Equation (2), the market size needed for the technology cost to fall belowc increases as the learning parameter α declines. This creates an additional complication into the analysis as lower values of α ask for bigger markets to reach cost maturity. As it turns out, this new effect is the dominant factor in determining the structure of the optimal FIT bill. Still, the following result can be presented in parallel to Theorem 2: Theorem 3. Consider Problem (P1 ) where a cost targetc is set to be accomplished by the exogenously-imposed deadline T . Then, there exist thresholds α(c, T ) andα(c, T ) on the learning parameter α so that (i) the target is not feasible if α ∈ 0, α(c, T )] , (ii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is decreasing if α ∈ α(c, T ),α(c, T ) , (iii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is increasing if α ∈ α(c, T ), 1 , and (iv) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is constant if α =α(c, T ).
Furthermore, α(c, T ) andα(c, T ) are both decreasing inc and T .
The proof of the above theorem is quite involved and requires careful handling of first and second order derivatives and the IGFR assumption on distribution F (.), as laid out in the appendix.
The forces driving Theorem 3 are in line with those behind Theorem 2, except that the required capacity for the policy goal moves with α. When α is too small and below α(c, T ), massive market size is needed to push down the technology cost. Thus, time limit T becomes too short for crossingc regardless of the policy expenditure. Once α becomes large enough for the target to be feasible, a two-tier framework emerges. For higher values of α where a small market size suffices to meet the objective, an API scheme is the right choice. This is because focusing only on efficient segments of the investor pool creates enough growth for the policy purpose. However, lower learning rates correspond to more capacity installments, and require the rapid market expansion that a DPI schedule cultivates. As α increases,c translates into a smaller capacity which is feasible to establish. First, a decreasing {π * t } t=1,...,T sequence appears optimal provided that α ≤ 0.33 (i.e., learning rate ≤ 20%). Then, after this threshold is passed, an increasing profitability index schedule becomes optimal. These two settings are illustrated in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) , respectively.
Note that in Figure 3 (b) and for α = 0.55, the start of the FIT program is deferred to period 4 (i.e., τ * = 3). When we compare the total cost under the optimal policy with that of a uniform profitability scheme, the optimality gap of as high as 90% is observed in our numerical examples. This happens when α is away fromα.
Under some mild conditions, similar thresholds exist for Problem (P2) with endogenous T , which determine the desirability and the direction of monotonicity in the optimal solution. This is formally stated in the following corollary. Corollary 1. Consider Problem (P2) in which policy horizon is endogenized. There exist lower boundsΠ and ρ so that if Π ≥Π and c 0 /c * ≥ ρ, thresholds α(c * ) andα(c * ) can be derived so that (i) the technology is not desirable if α ∈ 0, α(c * )] ,
(ii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T * is decreasing if α ∈ α(c * ),α(c * ) , (iii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T * is increasing if α ∈ α(c * ), 1 , and (iv) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T * is constant if α =α(c * ).
Furthermore, α(c * ) andα(c * ) are both decreasing inc * .
Corollary 1 pertains to Problem (P2) in which FIT program duration is endogenously-
induced as a function of the underlying environment. The corollary states that when the social value of the renewable energy technology is high enough and the technology is still in its early stages of development, a DPI or API strategy must be employed depending on whether learning rate is low or high, respectively. The conditions of the corollary are needed in the proof to ensure that the structure of the optimal policy does not change when T * increments upward or downward. If these conditions are violated, the direction of monotonicity in the optimal policy may alternate multiple times as α varies, and several segments with API and DPI policies may be observed.
Penetration Coefficient n
When n varies, the speed at which the information about the new technology spreads in the society changes. The next theorem formalizes the impact of n on the optimal policy.
Theorem 4. Consider Problem (P1 ) (or, equivalently, Problem (P1)), and assume that the technology is far enough from maturity, i.e., c 0 /c * ≥ ρ for some lower bound ρ. Then, there exist thresholds n(c, T ) andň(c, T ) on the penetration coefficient n so that (i) the target is not feasible if n ∈ 0, n(c, T )] ,
(ii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is decreasing if n ∈ n(c, T ),ň(c, T ) , (iii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is increasing if n ∈ ň(c, T ), ∞ , and (iv) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T is constant if n =ň(c, T ).
Furthermore, n(c, T ) andň(c, T ) are both decreasing inc and T .
Similarly, under some mild conditions (which hold in many real applications of the FIT policy), the two-tier structure of Theorem 4 is readily extendible to Problem (P2).
Corollary 2. Consider Problem (P2) in which policy horizon is endogenized. There exist lower boundsΠ and ρ so that if Π ≥Π and c 0 /c * ≥ ρ, thresholds n(c * ) andň(c * ) can be derived so that (i) the technology is not desirable if n ∈ 0, n(c * )] ,
(ii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T * is decreasing if n ∈ n(c * ),ň(c * ) , (iii) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T * is increasing if n ∈ ň(c * ), ∞ , and (iv) the optimal sequence {π * t } t=1,...,T * is constant if n =ň(c * ).
Furthermore, n(c * ) andň(c * ) are both decreasing inc * .
Therefore, for any fixed policy horizon T and feasible cost targetc (or capacity target M ), if the technology is sufficiently immature, lower values for n imply a DPI policy and higher values of n entail an API policy. Moreover, these properties hold when the policy horizon is endogenized if Π is big enough.
The results of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 propose specific policy guidelines for tariff-setting progression over time. Adjustments on the yield on investments in the technology need to be made by the policymakers over time depending on how weak or strong the learning and diffusion effects are. More explicitly, when target is set on cost, and learning and diffusion take place at a slow (resp. rapid) rate, it is advisable to let the profitability of the investments diminish (resp. inflate) with time.
In the hindsight, our framework provides some intuition on the default of Spain's FIT program. The country's Renewable Energy Plan (REP) 2005-2010 had established the solar PV capacity target of 400 MW to be developed by 2010 (Couture et al. 2010) , and a FIT policy was launched, offering lucrative investment opportunities to achieve this goal. The objective of these generous tariffs was to encourage adoption and stimulate competition and learning at large scale. In response to this incentive and due to rush of investments, the capacity milestone was transcended in fall 2007, 8 much earlier than expected. However, the lawmakers found themselves overwhelmed with huge commitments while the technology cost had not dropped as envisioned (Deutsche Bank 2009 ). In the context of our model, Spain's unsuccessful experience is attributable to underestimating the parameter n. In particular, even though the vigorous penetration in Spain's solar market had to be addressed using an API regime, the government's aggressive tariffs in early periods turned out to be ineffective and could not produce the desired outcome.
Conclusion
This paper studies the dynamic control of remuneration rates (prices) under feed-in tariff policy, the most widely implemented policy instrument for promoting renewable energy
technologies. Under such a mechanism, the government attracts investments and stimulates demand for the technology by sponsoring a certain compensation level or tariff for purchasing electricity from those who have adopted the technology. These tariffs, which change over time in response to evolving market realities, are intended to cover the non-competitively high generation costs and deliver a reasonable profit margin.
We provide a modeling framework which captures, at a macro level, the two principal dynamics governing the technology dispersion in the market. First, the widespread of the technology drives down its cost as it creates competition and leads to innovation, technological improvements, and learning. Second, the more the technology grows, the more people become aware of it, which stimulates additional demand for the future. These two network effects are represented by a learning curve and a diffusion process in our model, respectively.
We show that the surplus offered to the investors under the optimal FIT schedule is always monotone. This goes against the current practice of many FIT-implementing entities which try to maintain the same level of profitability across different time periods. The direction of monotonicity in the optimal FIT regime depends on market and technology characteristics and the way policy targets are envisaged. In particular, when the policy horizon is endogenous, the schedule of profitability indices should increase (resp. decrease) over time for low (reps. high) values of learning rates or penetration speeds. We also demonstrate that the annual capacity installation should not always increase over time as existing FIT policies sometime suggest.
Our set-up abstracts away from short term random shocks that the market demand and the technology cost might experience, and focuses on long term trends. Current practice accounts for these unexpected changes by adjusting tariffs so as to keep profitability of new investments constant. Similar adjustments to our API and DPI policies might be required.
Our results nonetheless suggest that policymakers should overall seek to consistently increase or decrease profitability, rather than trying to maintain a steady return.
From a technical standpoint, while we have assumed a fixed cost threshold for achieving grid parity, our model allows this threshold to be time-dependent. This speaks to the growing nature of oil and gas prices which may change the cost parity goal over time.
Moreover, even though this paper is centered around renewable energy technologies, it can also be applied to a wider spectrum of investment and technology patterns, which fall under the umbrella of green technologies. 
To show that v (x) ≤ 0, it suffices to verify that its numerator is non-positive, or, w(x) =
The IGFR assumption implies that xf (x)/F (x) x and hence,
Therefore, for any x satisfying w(x) ≤ 0, we have w (x) ≥ 0. In other words, w(x) is increasing wherever it is non-positive. Since w (0) Proof: First, consider g(x). The function is the product of two terms. The first term is decreasing in x sinceF (x) is decreasing in x, and the second term is decreasing in x as implied by Lemma 3. Thus, g(x) also decreases with x.
Next, consider h(x) and take its first derivative:
where u(x) is defined in Lemma 3. Finally, h(.) is strictly decreasing and hence, invertible.
Thus, φ(.) is a well-defined increasing function.
Lemma 5. For both Problems (P1) and (P2), the optimal solution satisfies M * t < (n + 1)M * t−1 . Further, there exists τ * so that M * t = M * t−1 if t ≤ τ * , and M * t > M * t−1 otherwise.
Proof: Equations (3) and (4) together imply that M * t = M * t−1 +nM * t−1F (γ * t ) ≤ (n+1)M * t−1 . However, for the equality to hold, we need to have γ * t = 0 which is equivalent to p * t = ∞. This never holds under the optimal policy since it makes the objective function unbounded. Now we show the second part of the lemma by contradiction. Suppose there exists a period t so that m * t = 0 but m * t−1 > 0. We offer the current p * t (which stimulates zero investment) in period t − 1, and the current p * t−1 in period t while keeping everything else fixed. The objective function improves due to discounting, which contradicts optimality.
Proof of Proposition 1 Let z t (x, y) denote the minimum cost to reach the market size y, starting from the initial capacity x, and within t periods. First consider single period problem z 1 (x, y). Due to Equation (2), c = c 0 (x/M 0 ) −α , and the potential demand is nx.
From Equation (3), p should be such that γ = c/p attracts the additional y − x installation, that is,
From the objective function of Problem (P1), it follows that
Express z t (M 0 , M t ) recursively:
Since the market size expands by at most a factor of (n + 1) in each period, we have
Applying the Envelope Theorem on z t (M 0 , M t ), we obtain
where M * t−1 is the solution to the dynamic program (5). Denote γ
.
Following similar steps for z t−1 (M 0 , M t−1 ), we have
For t > τ * + 1, the lemma implies that the optimal value for M t−1 does not occur at the boundaries of the feasible range given in Equation (6). Thus, the first order condition must hold at M * t−1 . That is,
To proceed, we first derive the second term as
Also note that M t /M t−1 = 1 + nF (γ t ), the first order condition (7) becomes
. Putting everything together, we conclude that γ * t = 1 (no installation) for periods t ≤ τ * , and γ * t = φ(γ * t−1 ) for t > τ * + 1. To establish uniqueness, we apply M * t = M * t−1 (1 + nF (γ * t )) for t ≥ τ * + 1 iteratively, and rewrite the constraint M * T ≥M as
where φ (k) (.) is the k th convolution of the function φ(.). The left hand side is decreasing in γ * τ * +1 because φ(.) andF (.) are increasing and decreasing, respectively. Further, the constraint holds as an equality under the optimal solution. It follows that for any given τ * , there exists at most one γ * τ * +1 satisfying the equality constraint, and this value also uniquely determines the entire sequence of γ * t 's. It remains to show that τ * is unique. Consider periods τ * and τ * + 1 under the optimal policy. By definition of τ * , we have M * τ * = M 0 (i.e., γ * τ * = 1) and M * τ * +1 > M 0 . If τ * > 0, consider starting from capacity M 0 before period τ * and aiming at meeting the target M * τ * +1 in two periods, we have
Moreover, for t > τ * + 1 we have
Now, by contradiction, assume that there are two distinct values τ 1 < τ 2 both optimal, and therefore satisfy Equation (8) in equality. Let τ 2 > τ 1 ≥ 0, and denote their corresponding optimal sequences by {γ 1 t } and {γ 2 t }, respectively. Since γ 2 τ 2 +1 > φ(1) (Equation (9)) and γ 1 τ 2 +1 ≤ φ(1) (Equation (10)), we have γ 2 τ 2 +1 > γ 1 τ 2 +1 . Also, Equation (8) implies
which is a contradiction. Thus, τ * is unique and satisfies
Now, consider (P2). We know that α 2 > α 1 results in Z 2 (c * , T ) ≤ Z 1 (c * , T ) for any feasible T , including T 1 , the optimal T when α = α 1 . Therefore 
which implies that the optimal sequence of γ * t 's must be decreasing. Next, we present the following lemma which will be used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 7. The solution to equationγ = φ(γ) is unique if exists. Ifγ exists and τ * = 0 in the optimal solution to Problem (P1), then the sequence of γ * t 's is decreasing if and only if
and that the second term is always positive. Since the first term is decreasing in x, if it is positive for some x = x 1 , it is also positive for all x ≤ x 1 . This implies that ∆(x) is unimodal over domain [0, 1] . Moreover, ∆(1) = 1 − δ ≥ 0, so ∆(x) = 0 has at most one root.
Supposeγ exists and τ * = 0. Then,γ = φ(γ) implies that
where the last equality follows from τ * = 0 and Equation (8), which holds as an equality at optimality. This further implies γ * 1 >γ. Then, ∆(.) being unimodal over [0, 1] together with ∆(1) ≥ 0 implies that ∆(γ * 1 ) > 0. Finally,
where the third inequality follows from g(γ * 1 ) = h(γ * 2 ). Thus, the sequence is decreasing.
Proof of Theorem 2
We try to find values of α for which solutionγ(α), as in Lemma 7, exists, and τ * (α) = 0, and the sequence of γ * t (α)'s is a constant. Equivalently, we want to find α so that γ * t (α) =γ(α) for t = 1, . . . , T . For such values of α, Equation (8) 
Next we show thatγ(α) is unimodal in α and hence Equation (13) Note that the first bracket is always negative (u (.) ≤ 0 from Lemma 3). Further, ∆(γ(α); α) = 0 implies that the denominator of the second bracket is also negative and hence, dγ(α)/dα has the same sign as the numerator. Now, assume dγ(α)/dα is positive at α = α 1 . We will show that the derivative is also positive at α = α 1 − , for infinitesimal . Define k(α) = 1 + nF (γ(α)) 1−α . Then,
Moreover, the derivative being positive at α = α 1 entailsγ(α 1 − ) <γ(α 1 ). It follows that k(α 1 − ) > k(α 1 ). According to Equation (14), δk(α) − log k(α) − 1 is increasing in k(α)
at k(α) = k(α 1 ). Thus,
This means that if dγ(α)/dα is positive at α = α 1 , it is also positive at any α < α 1 . Thus, γ(α) is unimodal in α, which implies that Equation (13) has at most two solutions,α ≤α.
First, considerα. We have M 0 1 + nF (γ(α − )) T >M becauseγ(α) is increasing at α =α. From Lemma 7, the sequence of γ * t (α)'s is decreasing at α =α − , and increasing at α =α + . Similarly, the sequence is increasing atα − and decreasing atα + . In this case, the sequence is decreasing. By Lemma 6, the same is true when τ * > 0.
Finally, we note that γ * T (α) − γ * T −1 (α) is continuous in α. Thus, it does not change sign without going through zero (at which point the sequence is a constant). We conclude that the monotonicity of sequence {γ * t (α)} t=1,...,T changes only whenγ(α) exists and τ * = 0. Further, when these conditions hold, the direction of monotonicity changes at most twice, so that the first change is from decreasing to increasing and the second is from increasing to decreasing.
For the last part of the theorem, recall M 0 1 + nF (γ(α))
If T increases orM decreases, the left hand side becomes bigger than the right hand side.
Then, by Lemma 7, the sequence decreases atα andα. It follows that an increase in T or a decrease inM leads to an increase inα and a decrease inα, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3 Similar to Proof of Theorem 2, we look for value(s) of α such that γ(α) exists, τ * (α) = 0, and the sequence of γ * t (α)'s is a constant. Equivalently, we want to find α so that γ * t (α) =γ(α) for t = 1, . . . , T . For such value(s) of α, applying Equation (8), and noting that τ * (α) = 0 and φ(γ(α)) =γ(α) gives us M 0 1 + nF (γ(α))
T =M , wherẽ M is the cumulative capacity equivalent to the costc, and can be derived from Equation ≤ 1 + nF (γ(α)) δk(α) − log k(α) − 1 1 − δk(α) (α − 1)αnf (γ(α)) , and 1 + nF (γ(n)) α − δ 1 + nF (γ(n)) < 0, which is implied by ∆(γ(n); n) = 0. After applying the above two equations, it follows that dnF (γ(n))/dn has the same sign as 1 + nF (γ(n)) α − δ 1 + nF (γ(n)) u (γ(n))F (γ(n)) + 1 + u(γ(n)) f (γ(n)) δαnF (γ(n)) + δ − 1 + nF (γ(n)) α .
The first term is always positive, and the second term is positive if nF (γ(n)) is large enough, which happens when the ratio c 0 /c * is sufficiently large. We conclude that among all n's for whichγ(n) exists and τ * (n) = 0, there exists at most one value which makes the sequence of γ * t (n)'s a constant. Call this valueň. Since nF (γ(n)) is increasing at n =ň, we have From Lemma 7, the sequence of γ * t (n)'s is increasing for n =ň − , and decreasing for n =ň + . The argument for the case whereγ(n) does not exist or τ * (n) > 0 follows the exact same logic as in the proof of Theorem 2. Therefore, the direction of monotonicity in the {γ * t (n)} t=1,...,T sequence can change only whenγ(n) exists and τ * (n) = 0. Further, when these conditions hold, the direction of monotonicity changes at most once, so that it goes from increasing to decreasing.
Finally, the existence of threshold n which determines the desirability of the technology follows from Lemma 2.
